Talk:Bundle theory

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Language plays a trick on us that can be seen in the problem of Bundle Theory. Since all properties are synthetic constructions of language, the trick language plays is that only our thinking provides reality to the properties of any object. An Apple does not have a property of "Red" or the property of "Juicy". Assuming you already believe in a concept called “Red”, an apple can be experienced as Red. “Red” can not be distilled from an Apple because “Red” is an abstraction from other experiences and not a “property” red contains. It would be more correct to say “An apple is red and juicy” and leave such expressions (which include at least six concepts) as dead-end logical propositions. Since the words "Red" and "Juicy" are simply abstractions of previous experiences, they contain only a personal summary concept of one individual. The experience of an apple is as close to the "Apple" as one can get. Every other analytic work of the mind after the fact is a synthesis of other experiences that cannot logically reveal any true essence of “Apple”. While our belief in a language-reality allow us to see our synthetic exercises as a kind of distillation of the first experience, such rarification is not possible since we are actually combining experiences to create each concept of a particular property. Language is a complicated belief system whose only connection to reality is always an abstraction of experience.

Nominal Difference

Even if we could know whether one theory was finally correct, that knowledge would only offer us a nominal difference in understanding the nature of objecthood. Both theories agree that objecthood is a kind of relationship of properties.

"Bundle" theory, as the name suggests, concedes that objects are a collection of properties, while denying that properties inhere in objects. That is, objects don't have properties, they are properties.

On the other hand, substance theory concedes that objects are made of properties, but asserts that properties inhere in objects. Objects have properties, but are not properties.

The only question is whether we prefer to call a forest, "a forest," or "many trees;" essentially, both theories assert that objecthood exists, but they disagree on how objecthood exists. This is a trick of language, akin to the question, "Is the glass half empty or half full?" Between two possible answers, the only difference is that--in place of the distinct objects that substance theorists propose--bundle theorists propose cipher objects. This difference is nominal.

-N.D.W. Seal Cove, Maine

Should there be an inclusion of the concept of wave/particle theory? - S. Thomas

This is a really good way of putting it. Should this be included in the article?--Pariah 22:26, Jun 16, 2005 (UTC)

An easier analogy is an automobile.... it is a collection of hundreds of pieces but is not a complete car without them all. Some components are the same as are used on other constructs (light bulbs, fuses, cabling etc).

Bundle Theory, Eastern Philosophy, and Mysticism

So, I've added some notes on how Bundle Theory in many ways resembles some Eastern philosophical concepts. If anyone has POV or reference concerns, please feel free to move the notes to this talk page, or to contact me on my own user talk page. Thanks--Pariah 22:26, Jun 16, 2005 (UTC)

Yeah sorry, Pariah - there ARE resemblances, but you seem to have mixed in some of your own views as well. It's pretty hard to sort out. :-) (20040302)

According to these notions, nothing in the universe has existence in and of itself, but only exists with relation to other objects. Hence, what Western philosophy might call a property refers to a relationship between the observer-perciever and the object being observed. Using the examples provide above, if you are looking at an apple, the concepts of "apple" as well as any other property you percieve (size, shape, colour, taste, mass, etc.) is in fact only a particular relationship between you and the apple.

Eastern traditions go farther, however, noting that this metaphysical situation applies to the observer him/her/itself. Thus, an individual person is understood as a series of dynamic relationships stitched together by a sense of continuity or awareness through time.

Moved for the moment

==Bundle Theory, Eastern Philosophy, and Mysticism==

Bundle Theory in many ways resembles many Eastern metaphysical approaches, including the Taoist concept of formlessness, and Buddhist concepts of Shunyata ("emptiness"), Dependent origination, and impermanence.

Ideas like this become intellectually problematic at this point, because they dissolve ordinary subject-object distinctions and causal relationships. Therefore, many Eastern traditions have developed contemplative techniques, such as Meditation, to give the observer a direct or "felt" experience of "bundled" reality. In this way, reason and direct experience are used together in the service of metaphysical investigation.

Also, while not always phrased in terms of bundles of properties, a kind of experiential Bundle Theory also appears in Martin Buber's book I and Thou, as well as in philosophical and/or spiritual tradtions from around the world. Such theories could also be referred to as a kind of "relational essentialism"--whereby an object's essence or substance does not exist on its own (as in conventional essentialism), but exists only in terms of its relationships with other objects/sets of properties.

Development of Bundle Theory

It would be nice if someone could give some details as to how bundle theory has developed through the history of ideas. What thinkers are associated with bundle theory? I see some has started doing this with the conception of Eastern philosophical understandings of the self, but it needs much more detail and should be more global, covering all major philosophical traditions (as much as possible). Does bundle theory relate at all to Empiricism or Phenomenalism? --chemica 06:16, 7 August 2006 (UTC)

Needs Hume reference

This article does not reference David Hume. This is like an article on relativity that doesn't mention Einstein.

As an aside, one has to wonder whether Pluto as a bundle of properties includes the property of being a planet. In 2006 the International Astronomical Union voted that it was not. One implication of this vote is that any entity in orbit around Pluto would suddenly find itself no longer orbiting around a planet. A paroled Klingon ship restricted to a planetary orbit might suddenly become a parole violator if its chosen planet had been Pluto. Would nearby guard ships notice the violation right away? And if they did, and if the IAU yielded to public pressure a few months later to rescind the vote, would the parole violation be stricken from the record? With these sorts of possibilities I have a hard time conceiving of Pluto as the bundle of its properties. Why should Pluto, or anyone near it, care what the IAU thinks? Vaughan Pratt 07:11, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

Max Black's argument against the principle of identity of indiscernibles is perhaps fatal for bundle theory. I think it is worth mentioning. The opposite to the bundle theory is substratum theory, not substance theories. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.105.20.221 (talk) 16:53, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

Identity of Indiscernibles

This article really should have a section on the Identity of Indiscernibles, which is surely amongst the most favoured of anti-bundle theory arguments. The argument runs something like this:

1. Two objects might be qualitatively identical, sharing exactly all properties except relational ones (eg "x is five mile away from y").

2. Relational properties of this kind are not properties in the sense of qualities, because they apply equally to both - they are symmetric (ie if x is five miles away from y, y is also five miles away from x)

3. Therefore the two objects would have identical properties

4. Thus it would seem that the bundle theorist would have to say that these two objects are identical (by Leibniz's Law)

5. This would seem to entail an intolerably strong version of the identity of indiscernibles (ruled out, eg, by Max Black's two metal spheres)

Or something like that. Anyway, it is an important objection and should be included. Batmanand | Talk 07:55, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

Mereological Nihilism

After reading the article on Mereological Nihilism, it seems that it is related to Bundle Theory, however I'm not an expert. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Thekappen (talk • contribs) 00:22, 21 December 2009 (UTC)

What does not have the properties of a thing?

Here [ http://analytical.wikia.com ] is a work that couples both substance theory and bundle theory. May be you can add the essence of it in this page, if you are interested in. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 210.212.249.50 (talk) 02:37, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

A confusing quotation

The quotation from Chandrakirti is very confusing. Some of the words do seem to describe bundle theory:

"[The self] is like a cart, which is not other than its parts... and does not possess them... its parts are not within it..."

But the remaining words often seem to say the opposite:

"... not non-other ... It is not within its parts...It is not the mere collection, and it is not the shape."