Yongle Emperor
| Yongle Emperor 永樂帝 | |||||||||||||||||||||
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| Emperor of the Ming dynasty | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Reign | 17 July 1402 – 12 August 1424 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Enthronement | 17 July 1402 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Predecessor | Jianwen Emperor | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Successor | Hongxi Emperor | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Prince of Yan | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Tenure | 2 May 1370 – 17 July 1402 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Successor | Himself as emperor | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Born | 2 May 1360 Yingtian Prefecture, Ming dynasty (present-day Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China) | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Died | 12 August 1424 (aged 64) Yumuchuan, Ming dynasty (present-day Duolun County, Inner Mongolia, China) | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Burial | 8 January 1425 Chang Mausoleum, Ming tombs, Beijing | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Spouse | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Issue Detail | |||||||||||||||||||||
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| House | Zhu | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Dynasty | Ming | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Father | Hongwu Emperor | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Mother | Empress Xiaocigao | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Religion | Confucianism | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Chinese name | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 永樂帝 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 永乐帝 | ||||||||||||||||||||
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The Yongle Emperor (2 May 1360 – 12 August 1424), also known by his temple name as the Emperor Chengzu of Ming, personal name Zhu Di, was the third emperor of the Ming dynasty, reigning from 1402 to 1424. He was the fourth son of the Hongwu Emperor, the founder and first emperor of the dynasty.
In 1370, he was granted the title of Prince of Yan. By 1380, he had relocated to Beijing and was responsible for protecting the northeastern borderlands. In the 1380s and 1390s, he proved himself to be a skilled military leader, gaining popularity among soldiers[1] and achieving success as a statesman.
In 1399, he rebelled against his nephew, the Jianwen Emperor, and launched a civil war known as the Jingnan campaign, or the campaign to clear away disorders. After three years of intense fighting, he emerged victorious and declared himself emperor in 1402. After ascending the throne, he adopted the era name Yongle, which means "perpetual happiness".
His reign is often referred to as the "second founding" of the Ming dynasty, as he made significant changes to his father's political policies.[2] Upon ascending the throne, he faced the aftermath of a civil war that had devastated the rural areas of northern China and weakened the economy due to a lack of manpower. In order to stabilize and strengthen the economy, the emperor first had to suppress any resistance. He purged the state administration of supporters of the Jianwen Emperor as well as corrupt and disloyal officials. The government also took action against secret societies and bandits. To boost the economy, the emperor promoted food and textile production and utilized uncultivated land, particularly in the prosperous Yangtze Delta region.
Additionally, he made the decision to elevate Beijing to the capital in 1403, reducing the significance of Nanjing. The construction of the new capital, which took place from 1407 to 1420, employed hundreds of thousands of workers daily. At the heart of Beijing was the official Imperial City, with the Forbidden City serving as the palace residence for the emperor and his family.[3] The emperor also oversaw the reconstruction of the Grand Canal, which was crucial for supplying the capital and the armies in the north.
The emperor was a strong supporter of both Confucianism and Buddhism. He supported the compilation of the massive Yongle Encyclopedia by employing two thousand scholars. This encyclopedia surpassed all previous ones, including the Four Great Books of Song from the 11th century. He also ordered the texts of the Neo-Confucians to be organized and used as textbooks for training future officials. The civil service examinations, held in a three-year cycle, produced qualified graduates who filled positions in the state apparatus. The emperor was known for his strict punishments for failures, but also for quickly promoting successful servants.[4] While he, like his father, was not afraid to use violence against opponents when necessary, he differed from his father in his abandonment of frequent purges. As a result, ministers held their posts for longer periods of time, leading to a more professional and stable state administration.
However, it was not just officials who enjoyed the emperor's favor and support. He ruled the empire primarily "from horseback", traveling between the two capitals, similar to the Yuan emperors. He also frequently led military campaigns into Mongolia.[5] However, this behavior was opposed by officials who felt threatened by the growing influence of eunuchs and military elites. These groups relied on imperial favor for their power.[5]
The emperor also made significant efforts to strengthen and consolidate the empire's hegemonic position in East Asia through foreign policy. Diplomatic messages and military expeditions were sent to "all four corners of the world". Missions were sent to countries near and far, including Manchuria, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and the Timurid Empire in Central Asia. Zheng He's famous voyages even reached the shores of Southeast Asia, India, Persia, and East Africa.
A major threat to the security of the empire was posed by the Mongols, who were divided into three groups—the Uriankhai in the southeast were mostly loyal, while the eastern Mongols and western Oirats were problematic. Ming China alternately supported and opposed them. The Yongle Emperor personally led five campaigns into Mongolia, and the decision to move the capital from Nanjing to Beijing was motivated by the need to keep a close eye on the restless northern neighbors.
The Yongle Emperor was a skilled military leader and placed great emphasis on the strength of his army. However, his wars were ultimately unsuccessful. The war in Jiaozhi (present-day northern Vietnam), which began with an invasion in 1407, lasted until the end of his reign. Four years after his death, the Ming army was forced to retreat back to China. Despite his efforts, the Yongle Emperor's Mongol campaigns did not significantly alter the balance of power or ensure the security of the northern border.[6]
The Yongle Emperor died in 1424 and was buried in the Chang Mausoleum, the largest of the tombs of the Ming emperors located near Beijing.
Early years
[edit]Childhood
[edit]
Zhu Di was born on 2 May 1360, as the fourth son of Zhu Yuanzhang.[8] At the time, Zhu Yuanzhang was based in Nanjing and was an independent general of the Song dynasty. This dynasty was one of the states formed during the Red Turban Rebellion, which was a rebellion against the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty that controlled China. In the 1360s, Zhu Yuanzhang conquered China, established the Ming dynasty, and declared himself emperor. He is commonly known by his era name as the Hongwu Emperor.
After taking the throne, Zhu Di claimed to be the son of Zhu Yuanzhang's primary wife, Lady Ma, who had been empress since 1368. However, other sources suggest that his real mother was a concubine of the Hongwu Emperor with the title Consort Gong, who was either Mongolian (from the Khongirad tribe)[9] or possibly Korean[10]. After becoming emperor, Zhu Di attempted to present himself as the Hongwu Emperor's legitimate successor by declaring himself and his fifth son, Zhu Su, as the only sons of Empress Ma in the 1403 edition of the official Veritable Records of Emperor Taizu. This was clearly absurd, as it was unlikely that a son of the empress would not be named as successor during the Hongwu Emperor's lifetime. Therefore, in the later version of 1418, all five of the Hongwu Emperor's sons were recognized as her descendants.[11]
Zhu Di spent his childhood in Nanjing, where he was raised with a strong emphasis on discipline and modesty, along with the other children of Zhu Yuanzhang. Out of all his siblings, he had a special fondness for Princess Ningguo (寧國公主), Zhu Fu (朱榑), and Zhu Su, who was only 15 months younger. Despite their contrasting personalities, Zhu Di and Zhu Su became the closest of friends. While Zhu Di enjoyed activities such as archery and horseback riding, Zhu Su preferred studying literature and tending to plants.[12]
The emperor took great care in the education of his sons, enlisting the help of prominent scholars from the empire. Initially, Song Lian was appointed as the teacher for the crown prince, and also gave lectures to the other princes. Song Lian's successor, Kong Keren (孔克仁), had a significant influence on Zhu Di, teaching him philosophy and ethics. However, Zhu Di's favorite subject was the history of the Han dynasty, particularly the emperors Gaozu and Wudi. In fact, he often referenced examples from the life of Qin Shi Huang in his decrees.[13]
Youth
[edit]On 22 April 1370, the emperor's sons, with the exception of the crown prince, were granted princely titles. Zhu Di was bestowed with the title of Prince of Yan.[14] Yan was a region located in the northeast of China, with its most significant city being Beiping (present-day Beijing). During the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty, Beiping served as the capital of China. After being conquered by the Ming dynasty in 1368, it became a crucial stronghold for the troops guarding the northern border of China and was also designated as the capital of the province with the same name.
At that time, Zhu Di was given his own household, with adviser Hua Yunlong[iii] and tutor Gao Xian at its head. Gao Xian spent the next four to five years lecturing him on Confucian classics, history, agriculture, and irrigation. He also trained the prince in poetry and prose writing, and explained the rules of governance and the selection of subordinates. After Hua's death and Gao's dismissal, Fei Yu, Qiu Guang, Wang Wuban, and Zhu Fu took over Zhu Di's education.[15][iv] Despite receiving a comprehensive education from esteemed teachers, Zhu Di's true passion always lay in military pursuits rather than scholarly pursuits and palace discussions.
In early 1376, he married Lady Xu, the daughter of Xu Da, who was ranked first among all of the early Ming generals. She was two years younger than him.[17] Lady Xu was known for her intelligence, decisiveness, and energy. The couple welcomed their first son, Zhu Gaochi, on 16 August 1378, followed by their second son, Zhu Gaoxu, in 1380.[18] Their third son, Zhu Gaosui, was born three years later.
A few weeks after the wedding, he traveled to Fengyang (then known as Zhongdu—the Central Capital) where he underwent seven months of military training alongside his elder brothers, Zhu Shuang and Zhu Gang. Two years later, he returned to Fengyang with his younger brothers, Zhu Su, Zhu Zhen, and Zhu Fu, and stayed for an additional two years. During this time, he not only trained in command and combat, but also gained knowledge in logistics and the acquisition and transportation of materials and supplies for warfare. It was during this period that his organizational skills began to emerge, which he later utilized effectively in his battles. He also took the opportunity to disguise himself as a regular soldier and immerse himself in the lives of ordinary people. Looking back, he considered his time in Fengyang to be the happiest days of his life.[19]
In 1376, Li Wenzhong, the nephew and adopted son of the Hongwu Emperor, who was responsible for defending the north, was given the responsibility of preparing the prince's palace in Beijing. He utilized the former palaces of the Yuan emperors, providing Zhu Di with a larger and more fortified residence compared to his brothers, some of whom resided in converted temples or county offices. General Li also focused on fortifying the city, a decision that would have consequences during the civil war when his son, Li Jinglong, unsuccessfully attempted to besiege Beiping in 1399.[20]
Prince of Yan in Beiping
[edit]In April 1380,[21] at the age of twenty, he moved to Beiping. He encountered a strong Mongolian influence, which the government tried to suppress by banning Mongolian customs, clothing, and names.[22] The city had recovered from the famine and wars of the 1350s and 1360s and was experiencing growth. Along with the hundreds of thousands of soldiers stationed in the region, the city was also home to officials administering the province, as well as artisans and laborers from all over the country. The main concern of the local authorities was providing enough food for the population. Peasants were relocated to the north, soldiers and convicts were sent to cultivate the land, and merchants were granted licenses to trade salt in exchange for bringing grain to the region.[23][v] The government also transported food supplies to the city.[22]
Zhu Di's interest in the military was put into practice when he personally trained his own guard.[22] He used his detachments as a means of balancing the power of the provincial commander, who was unable to mobilize troops without authorization from the emperor and approval from the prince. Meanwhile, the prince had the freedom to train and deploy his own guard.[24][25] In 1381, Zhu Di had his first experience in the field when he joined Xu Da's campaign against the Mongols, led by Nayur Buqa.[22]
In the 1380s, Zhu Di served in border defense under the leadership of his father-in-law, Xu Da. After Su's death in 1385, Fu Youde, Xu's deputy, took over leadership. In 1387, Zhu Di participated in a successful attack on the Mongols in Liaodong, led by Feng Sheng. The following year, a Ming army led by Lan Yu made a foray into eastern Mongolia and defeated the Mongol khan Tögüs Temür, capturing many prisoners and horses. However, both generals were accused of mistreating captives and misappropriating booty, which was reported to the emperor by the prince.[26]
In January 1390, the emperor entrusted his sons with independent command for the first time. The princes of Jin (Zhu Gang), Yan (Zhu Di), and Qi (Zhu Fu) were given the task of leading a punitive expedition against the Mongol commanders Nayur Buqa and Alu Temür, who were threatening Shanxi and Gansu. Zhu Di demonstrated excellent command skills when he defeated and captured both Mongol commanders in battle. They then served under him with their troops.[27] The emperor himself appreciated Zhu Di's success, which contrasted with the hesitancy of the Prince of Jin. Zhu Di continued to lead armies into battle against the Mongols repeatedly and with great success.[28]
In 1392, the emperor's eldest son and crown prince, Zhu Biao, died. The court then discussed who would succeed him, and ultimately, the primogeniture viewpoint, advocated by scholars from the Hanlin Academy and high officials, prevailed. As a result, Zhu Biao's son, Zhu Yunwen, was appointed as the new successor. Generals Feng Sheng, Fu Youde, and Lan Yu (who were related to the successor by blood) were chosen as his tutors and teachers.[29] However, due to a recommendation from Zhu Di, the Hongwu Emperor began to suspect the three generals of treason.[30] It is worth noting that Zhu Di did not have a good relationship with Lan Yu, and according to historian Wang Shizhen (王世貞; 1526–1590), he was responsible for Lan Yu's execution in March 1393. The other two generals also died under unclear circumstances at the turn of 1394 and 1395. In their place, princes were appointed. For example, in 1393, the Prince of Jin was given command of all the troops in Shanxi province, and the Prince of Yan was given command in Beiping province.[30] Additionally, Zhu Shuang, Prince of Qin, was in charge of Shaanxi, but he died in 1395.[31]
The Hongwu Emperor, who was deeply affected by the death of his two eldest sons and the strained relations between his remaining sons and the heir, made the decision to revise the rules governing the imperial family for the fourth time.[32] The new edition significantly limited the rights of the princes.[vi] However, these changes had little impact on Zhu Di's status as they did not affect his main area of expertise—the military.[34] Furthermore, the prince was cautious not to give any reason for criticism. For example, he did not object to the execution of his generals Nayur Buqa and Alu Temür, who were accused of treason. He also exercised caution in diplomatic relations, such as when he welcomed Korean delegations passing through Beiping, to avoid any indication of disrespect towards the emperor's authority.[34]
Out of the six princes[vii] responsible for guarding the northern border, Zhu Di was the second oldest but also the most capable. He had operated in a vast territory, stretching from Liaodong to the bend of the Yellow River. He was not afraid to take risks, as demonstrated by his defeat of the Mongols led by Polin Temür at Daning in the summer of 1396.[35] He also went on a raid with the Prince of Jin several hundred kilometers north of the Great Wall, which earned them a sharp reprimand from the emperor.[36] In April 1398, Zhu Di's elder brother, the Prince of Jin, died, leaving Zhu Di as the undisputed leader of the northern border defense.[37] Two months later, Zhu Di's father, the Hongwu Emperor, also died.
Rise to power
[edit]Conflict with the Jianwen Emperor
[edit]
After the death of the Hongwu Emperor, Zhu Yunwen ascended the throne as the Jianwen Emperor. His closest advisers immediately began reviewing the Hongwu Emperor's reforms, with the most significant change being an attempt to limit and eventually eliminate the princes who were the sons of the Hongwu Emperor and served as the emperor's support and controlled a significant portion of the military power during his reign. The government employed various methods to remove the five princes, including exile, house arrest, and even driving them to suicide.[viii]
Zhu Di was considered the most dangerous of all the princes.[39] He was an experienced military leader and the oldest surviving descendant of the Hongwu Emperor. Due to this, the government treated him with caution and limited his power. They replaced military commanders in the northeast with generals loyal to the Jianwen Emperor and transferred Zhu Di's personal guard outside of Beiping.[40] Despite this, Zhu Di managed to convince the emperor of his loyalty. He even asked for mercy for his friend Zhu Su[38] and begged for permission to return his sons, who had been staying in Nanjing since the funeral of the Hongwu Emperor. This was done by the government as a precaution, effectively holding them as hostages.[10] However, in June 1399, the emperor's adviser, Huang Zicheng, convinced the emperor that releasing Zhu Di's sons would help calm the situation.[40] Unfortunately, the result was the exact opposite.
In early August 1399, Zhu Di used the arrest of two of his officials as a pretext for rebellion.[41] He claimed that he was rising up to protect the emperor from the corrupt court officials. With the support of Beijing dignitaries,[ix] he gained control of the city's garrison and occupied the surrounding prefectures and counties.[42] He attempted to justify his actions through letters sent to the court in August and December 1399, as well as through a public statement.[41]
In his letters and statements, he repeatedly asserted that he had no desire for the throne. However, as the eldest living son of the deceased emperor, he felt a duty to restore the laws and order that had been dismantled by the new government. He explained that this was out of respect for his late father. He also accused the current emperor and his advisors of withholding information about his father's illness and preventing him from attending the funeral. Furthermore, he condemned their unjust treatment of the emperor's uncles, who were his own younger brothers. He justified his actions as necessary self-defense, not against the emperor himself, but against his corrupt ministers. He referred to these actions as the Jingnan campaign, a campaign to clear away disorders.[41]
Civil war
[edit]
At the start of the war, Zhu Di commanded a force of 100,000 soldiers and only held control over the immediate area surrounding Beiping. Despite the Nanjing government's larger number of armies and greater material resources, Zhu Di's soldiers were of higher quality and he possessed a strong Mongol cavalry. Most importantly, his military leadership skills were superior to the indecisiveness and lack of coordination displayed by the government's generals.[43]
In September 1399, a government army of 130,000 soldiers, led by the experienced veteran general Geng Bingwen, marched towards Zhending, a city located southwest of Beiping. However, by the end of the month, they were defeated. In response, the court appointed a new commander, Li Jinglong, who then led a new army to besiege Beiping on 12 November.[43] Zhu Di, who had been gathering troops in the northeast, swiftly returned and defeated the surprised Li army. The soldiers from the south, who were not accustomed to the cold weather, were forced to retreat to Dezhou in Shandong.[44]
In 1400, there were battles in the southern part of Beiping province and northwestern Shandong, with varying levels of success. In the spring, Zhu Di led a successful attack into Datong, defeating Li Jinglong near Baoding in May and outside Dezhou in June. However, due to concerns about potential enemy reinforcements, Zhu Di ended the siege of Jinan in September and retreated to Beiping. Li Jinglong's lackluster performance led the government to appoint Sheng Yong as the new commander of the counterinsurgency army.[44]
In 1401, Zhu Di attempted to weaken the enemy by attacking smaller units, which disrupted the supply of government troops. Both sides then focused on breaking through along the Grand Canal. In January, Zhu Di suffered a defeat at Dongchang, but in April he was victorious at Jia River. The front continued to move back and forth for the rest of the year.[45]
In 1402, instead of launching another attack along the Grand Canal, Zhu Di advanced further west and bypassed Dezhou. He then conquered Xuzhou in early March. The government troops retreated south to Zhili and were repeatedly defeated. In July, the rebels reached the north bank of the Yangtze River. The commander of the government fleet defected to Zhu Di's side, allowing the rebel army to cross the river without resistance and advance on Nanjing.[46] Due to the betrayal of Li Jinglong and Zhu Hui, Zhu Di's younger brother, the capital city was captured on 13 July 1402, with little resistance. During the clashes, the palace was set on fire, resulting in the deaths of the emperor, his empress, and his son.[47]
Accession to the throne
[edit]On 17 July 1402, Zhu Di ascended the throne, officially succeeding his father, the Hongwu Emperor. However, even as late as the summer of 1402, the new emperor was still dealing with the followers of the Jianwen Emperor. These followers denied the legitimacy of Zhu Di's rule and he responded by erasing the Jianwen Emperor's reign from history. This included abolishing the Jianwen era and extending the Hongwu era until the end of 1402.[47] In addition, Zhu Di abolished the reforms and laws implemented by the Jianwen government, restored the titles and privileges of the princes, and destroyed government archives (with the exception of financial and military records).[48] He also attempted to involve respected supporters of the Jianwen Emperor, such as Fang Xiaoru and Liu Jing (劉璟), in his administration. However, they refused and were subsequently executed.[49] Similarly, Huang Zicheng and Qi Tai were executed, along with their family members, teachers, students, and followers. Many others were imprisoned or deported to the border, resulting in a purge that affected tens of thousands of people.[50]
After Zhu Di ascended to the imperial throne, the Veritable Records of Emperor Taizu were rewritten. The original version, created in 1402 at the court of the Jianwen Emperor, was deemed unacceptable by the new regime. In late 1402, the authors of the original version began to revise their work, completing it in July 1403. However, the emperor was dissatisfied with the revised version and in 1411, he ordered a new version to be prepared. This new version was completed in June 1418, and changes focused primarily on Zhu Di's claim to the throne. It included claims that he was the son of Empress Ma, that the Hongwu Emperor had considered appointing him as successor, that he was to be the regent of the Jianwen Emperor, and that he was an exceptionally talented military leader who was highly favored by his father.[51]
Administration
[edit]
In contrast to the frequent changes in offices during the Hongwu Emperor's reign, the high levels of the Yongle Emperor's administration remained stable.[52] While the emperor did occasionally imprison a minister, the mass purges seen in the Hongwu era did not occur again. The most significant political matters were overseen by eunuchs and generals, while officials were responsible for managing finances, the judiciary, and routine tasks. As a result, the atomization of administration that was characteristic of the Hongwu Emperor's rule diminished, allowing the emperor to focus less on routine details.[53]
The political influence of the bureaucratic apparatus gradually increased, and under the Yongle Emperor's rule, ministers were able to challenge the emperor, even at the cost of their freedom or lives. The most significant change was the emergence of the Grand Secretariat, which played a crucial role in the politics of the Yongle Emperor's successors. Led by the Grand Secretaries, officials gained control of the government.[54]
Princes and generals
[edit]The emperor restored the titles of the princes of Zhou, Qi, and Min, which had been abolished by the Jianwen Emperor. However, these titles did not come with the same power and authority as before.[55] During the latter half of his reign, the Yongle Emperor accused many of these princes of committing crimes and punished them by removing their personal guards. Interestingly, he had previously condemned the same actions when they were carried out by the Jianwen Emperor.[56] In order to reduce political threats, the Yongle Emperor relocated several border princes from the north to central and southern China.[x] By the end of his reign, the princes had lost much of their political influence.[55]
One of the Yongle Emperor's first actions upon assuming the throne was to reorganize the military command. He promoted loyal generals and granted them titles and ranks. In October 1402, he appointed two dukes (gong; 公)—Qiu Fu and Zhu Neng (朱能), thirteen marquises (hou; 侯), and nine counts (bo; 伯). Among these appointments were one duke and three counts from the dignitaries who had defected to his side before the fall of Nanjing—Li Jinglong, Chen Xuan (陳瑄), Ru Chang (茹瑺), and Wang Zuo (王佐). In June 1403, an additional nine generals from the civil war were appointed as marquises or counts. In the following years, meritorious military leaders from the campaign against the Mongols were also granted titles of dukes, marquises, and counts, including those of Mongolian origin.[57]
The emperor established a new hereditary military nobility. While their income from the state treasury (2200–2500 shi of grain for dukes, 1500–800 for marquises, and 1000 for counts; with 1 shi being equivalent to 107 liters) was not particularly high, the prestige associated with their titles was more significant. They commanded armies in the emperor's name, without competition from the princes who had been stripped of their influence. The nobility also held immunity from punishment by local authorities. However, there were notable differences from the Hongwu era. During that time, the generals, who were former comrades-in-arms of the emperor, held a higher status, had their own followers, and wielded considerable power in their assigned areas. This eventually posed a threat to the emperor, leading to their elimination. Under the Yongle Emperor, members of the nobility did not participate in regional or civil administration, nor were they assigned permanent military units. Instead, they were given ad hoc assembled armies. Additionally, the emperor often personally led campaigns accompanied by the nobility, strengthening their personal relationships.[58] As a result, the military nobility was closely tied to the emperor and remained loyal. There was no need for purges, and any isolated cases of punishment were due to the failures and shortcomings of those involved. Overall, the nobility elevated the emperor's prestige and contributed to the military successes of his reign.[59]
Officials and authorities
[edit]Grand Secretaries during the reign of the Yongle Emperor, from 1402–1424. The first two were appointed in August 1402, while the rest were appointed a month later.
- Huang Huai, to 1414 (imprisoned);
- Xie Jin, to 1407 (transferred to Guangxi);
- Hu Guang, to 1418 (died in office);
- Yang Rong, to 1440 (died in office);
- Yang Shiqi, to 1444 (died in office);
- Jin Youzi, to 1431 (died in office);
- Hu Yan, to 1404 (transferred to the head of the Imperial University).
At the head of the Grand Secretariat stood briefly in 1402 Huang Huai, followed by Xie Jin, and from 1407 by Hu Guang until his death in 1418, when Yang Rong took over until the end of the Yongle Emperor's reign.
The emperor reorganized the civilian administration, gaining the support of officials who had often served under the previous government. He restored the administrative structure of the Hongwu era, while also making some changes. First and foremost, in 1402, the Grand Secretariat was created to act as an intermediary between the emperor and the government, partially replacing the Central Secretariat that had been abolished in 1380. Despite their informal position, the Grand Secretaries quickly gained dominance in the civil administration.[59]
The Grand Secretariat was established in August 1402, when the emperor began to address current administrative issues during a working dinner with Huang Huai and Xie Jin after the evening audience. In September 1402, he appointed five additional Grand Secretaries.[60] These Grand Secretaries were all from the south or southeast[xi] and were highly educated and skilled in administration, having previously served in lower positions in the Jianwen Emperor administration. Despite their relatively low status (at most fifth rank), they were given high titles in the crown prince's household. Over time, they evolved from subordinate assistants responsible for organizing correspondence and formulating responses to becoming influential politicians who proposed solutions to problems. Their close proximity to the emperor gave them an advantage over the ministers. The emperor kept his Grand Secretaries with him, and some even accompanied him on his Mongol campaigns. During this period, the empire was governed by the crown prince with the assistance of other Grand Secretaries and selected ministers.[62] The crown prince developed a close relationship with the Grand Secretaries and became the de facto representative of the officials.[54]
The Yongle Emperor was meticulous in his selection of thr top officials for the state apparatus, including the members of the Grand Secretariat and the ministers. He placed particular trust in those who had served him during the civil war, such as Jin Zhong (金忠), Guo Zi, Lü Zhen (呂震), and Wu Zhong (吳中).[63] These ministers came from all over China, but were all highly educated and capable administrators. Among them, Minister of Revenue Xia Yuanji was the most trusted by the emperor. Xia advocated for moderation in spending and using resources for the benefit of the population, which earned him the respect of the Yongle Emperor for his honesty and transparency.[64] Xia held this position for nineteen years until 1421, when he, along with Minister of Justice Wu Zhong and Minister of War Fang Bin, protested against the costly campaign into Mongolia. Despite their objections, the emperor ultimately prevailed and Fang Bin committed suicide, while Wu Zhong and Xia Yuanji were imprisoned. However, after the Yongle Emperor's death, they were exonerated and returned to their positions of authority.[65] Other notable ministers who served for many years included Jian Yi (蹇義), Song Li (宋禮), Liu Quan (劉觀), and Zhao Hong, who held various ministerial positions.
During most of the Yongle Emperor's reign, four out of the six ministries (Personnel, Revenue, Rites, and Works) were headed by the same minister. This continuity of leadership continued even after the emperor's death, with many ministers remaining in their positions.[65]
The regular cycle of civil service examinations also contributed to the improvement and stabilization of administration at lower levels. In the second decade of the Yongle Emperor's reign, the examinations were held every three years.[54] A total of 1,833 individuals passed the examinations in the capital,[66] and the majority of these graduates were appointed to government positions. The Imperial University, which was previously responsible for selecting officials, lost its significance and became a place for candidates to study for the palace examinations.[67] By the end of the Yongle Emperor's reign, the Ministry of Personnel had a sufficient number of examination graduates to fill important positions at the county level and above. Overall, the administration became more qualified and stable.[66]
Eunuchs
[edit]
The Yongle Emperor relied heavily on eunuchs, more so than his father did. He even recruited eunuchs from the Jianwen era, with whom he had been associated during the civil war. These eunuchs came from various backgrounds, including Mongolian, Central Asian, Jurchen, and Korean. In addition to their duties within the Forbidden City, the Yongle Emperor trusted their unwavering loyalty and often assigned them tasks outside the palace's walls, such as surveillance and intelligence gathering.[66]
Eunuchs also held positions of military command and led diplomatic missions. However, their role as the emperor's secret agents, responsible for monitoring both civilian and military officials, was well-known but also unpopular and feared. While they were known for exposing corrupt officials, they also had a reputation for abusing their power and succumbing to corruption themselves. In 1420, a special investigation office was established, informally known as the "Eastern Depot" due to its location in the palace. This office was responsible for overseeing the judiciary, but it became infamous for its role in the disappearance of individuals. Stories of innocent imprisonment, torture, and unexplained deaths involving the office circulated until the end of the dynasty.[68]
Succession disputes
[edit]The Yongle Emperor had four sons, the first three by Empress Xu, while the fourth, Zhu Gaoxi, died in infancy. The eldest son, Zhu Gaochi, was not physically fit and instead of warfare, he focused on literature and poetry. The second son, Zhu Gaoxu, was a tall and strong, a successful warrior. However, the third son, Zhu Gaosui, was mediocre in character and ability.[69]
Many influential officials, including General Qiu Fu, convinced the emperor that the second son should be the crown prince. They argued for his prowess and military skills, citing his past actions of saving his father from danger and turning the tide of battles during the civil war. However, Grand Secretary Xie Jin disagreed and argued that the eldest son would win the hearts of the people with his humanity. He also reminded the emperor of the future accession of Zhu Zhanji, the emperor's favorite grandson and Zhu Gaochi's eldest son. Ultimately, on 9 May 1404, Zhu Gaochi was appointed as the crown prince, with the Yongle Emperor appointing Qiu Fu as his tutor the following day.[69]
At the same time, he appointed Zhu Gaoxu as the Prince of Han and entrusted him with control of Yunnan. Zhu Gaosui became the Prince of Zhao, based in Beijing. However, Zhu Gaoxu refused to go to Yunnan. His father gave in to his wishes, which allowed him to provoke conflicts with his older brother. In the spring of 1407, he succeeded in slandering Xie Jin, who was accused of showing favoritism towards Jiangxi natives in the examinations. As a result, Xie Jin was transferred to the province and later imprisoned.[70] Huang Huai (from 1414 until the end of the Yongle Emperor's reign) and Yang Shiqi (briefly in 1414), both accused of not observing the ceremony, also faced imprisonment due to their support of the crown prince and resulting enmity with Zhu Gaoxu. In 1416, Zhu Gaoxu was given a new fief in Qingzhou Prefecture in Shandong. Once again, he refused to leave, which led to a reprimand from his father. He then began to raise his own army and even had an army officer killed. As a result, his father stripped him of his titles, demoted him to a common subject, and later imprisoned him. The following year, he was deported to Shandong.[71]
Military
[edit]
During the Yongle Emperor's reign, the military underwent significant changes. He implemented four major reforms, including the abolition of the princely guards (huwei; 護衛), the relocation of the majority of the capital guards (jingwei; 京衛) from Nanjing to Beijing, the establishment of the capital training camps (jingying; 京營), and the reorganization of the defenses along the northern border.[72]
The emperor reorganized the Embroidered Uniform Guard (Jinyiwei), which was responsible for carrying out secret police duties. Its main focus was handling politically sensitive cases, such as investigating members of the imperial family. However, there were instances of corruption and abuse of power within the organization, most notably the case of Ji Gang (紀綱). Ji Gang, who had been the emperor's favorite during the civil war, was eventually accused of plotting against the throne and executed in 1416. By 1420, the Embroidered Uniform Guard had been overshadowed by the Eastern Depot, which also conducted investigations on its officers.[68]
The abolition of the princes' armies was a logical decision. Zhu Di's military strength as the Prince of Yan played a crucial role in his rise to the throne, and he was determined to prevent history from repeating itself. The existing princely guards were mostly integrated into the regular army, and although the Yongle Emperor's sons had played an active and successful role in the civil war, they were not given command of the armies after it ended. Instead, campaigns were led by dependable generals or the emperor himself.[56]
One significant and permanent step taken during this time was the relocation of a large portion of the army to the Beijing area. As the capital moved to Beijing, the majority of the 41 guard units of the Nanjing garrison also made the move.[56] Among the troops stationed in Beijing were 22 guard units of the Imperial Guard (qinjun; 親軍), totaling 190,800 men.[73] This included the original three guard units of Zhu Di's princely guard.[56] Overall, approximately 25–30% of the Ming army (74 guard units in the mid-1430s) was now concentrated in and around Beijing, with a total strength of over two million men under the Yongle Emperor's reign.[74] As a result, soldiers and their families made up a significant portion of the population in the Beijing area.[xii] To oversee the remaining guard units in and around Nanjing, a military commander position was established, often filled by eunuchs.[75]
After the second campaign in Mongolia, the emperor made the decision to enhance the training of his soldiers. He established the capital training camps, known as the Three Great Camps (Sandaying), in the vicinity of Beijing. In 1415, he issued a decree requiring all guards in the northern provinces and the southern metropolitan area to send a portion of their troops to these camps for training. The camps were specifically designed for the training of infantry, cavalry, and units equipped with firearms. Each camp was under the leadership of a eunuch and two generals.[74] The emperor placed great emphasis on the importance of cavalry in successful combat in the steppe. As a result, the number of horses in the army significantly increased from 37,993 in 1403 to 1,585,322 in 1423.[76]
At the beginning of the Yongle Emperor's reign, the defense system on the northern border was reorganized. Under the Hongwu Emperor, the defense of the north was organized in two lines. The first, the outer line, consisted of eight garrisons located in the steppe north of the Great Wall. These garrisons served as bases for forays into Mongolian territory. The second line of defense was along the Great Wall.[77] However, at the time, the Great Wall had not yet been built. This strategic placement allowed for the prevention of Mongol raids even in the steppe. Under the Yongle Emperor's reign, the outer line was abandoned[xiii] with the exception of the garrison in Kaiping.[xiv] The emperor then resettled friendly Mongolian Uriankhai on the vacated territory.
The border troops along the northern borders were placed under the authority of nine newly established border regional commands.[78] These commands were under the control of provincial military commanders (zongbing guan; 總兵官) and were located in Liaodong, Jizhou, Xuanfu, Datong, Shanxi, Yansui, Guyuan (in Shaanxi), Ningxia, and Gansu. Unlike in the Hongwu era, the soldiers stationed on the border were not from nearby guards, but were instead from the three capital training camps. The commanders of these areas were chosen from officers of the inland garrisons or higher commands.[79][xv] By the end of the Yongle era, there were 863,000 soldiers stationed in garrisons along the northern border.[76]
The withdrawal to the Great Wall was a significant decline in security, as evidenced by later Ming officials debating the occupation of Ordos. The main fortress of the inner line, Xuanfu, was vulnerable to Mongol attacks after the withdrawal. However, under the Yongle Emperor, the negative effects of the withdrawal were overshadowed by Ming power and strength. Unfortunately, after his death, the Chinese did not make any attempts to reclaim the steppe for the rest of the Ming dynasty.[77]
The navy was not a separate branch of the army; only the coastal guards had ships. By 1420, there were approximately 1,350 small patrol ships and an equal number of large warships scattered among the coastal garrisons. The Nanjing fleet consisted of 400 warships, 400 cargo ships manned by soldiers from Nanjing garrison guards, who were trained for naval combat (four of the ten Nanjing guards had "naval" names), and 250 treasure ships and other ships used for long-distance voyages.[80]
Economy
[edit]Population, agriculture, and crafts
[edit]Around 1400, the Ming dynasty had a population of 90 million.[81] During the first third of the 15th century, the weather was more stable and warmer compared to before and after. This favorable climate allowed for rich harvests, making agriculture the foundation of the country's prosperity. Although there were occasional local disasters such as epidemics or floods, they did not significantly alter the overall situation.[2] The government provided assistance to affected regions using state funds.
The Yongle Emperor recognized that the most effective way to ensure his own rule and that of his descendants was by supporting the peasants. For example, in 1403, when the crops were destroyed by a locust invasion in Henan, he took the initiative to organize relief efforts for the affected population. He also punished negligent officials and rejected the suggestion of Minister of Revenue, Yu Xin (郁新), to punish officials who were unable to collect taxes in full. The emperor argued that the root of the problem was the natural disaster, not the officials.[82] In 1404, when he was informed of the increase in silk production in Shandong, he responded that he would not be satisfied until there was enough food and clothing for everyone in the empire, ensuring that no one suffered from hunger or cold.[83]
The northern provinces were impoverished and unproductive, and their local army and administration had become reliant on importing rice from the south during the Hongwu era. The relocation of the capital to Beijing resulted in an increase in the number of soldiers, officials, artisans, and laborers, exacerbating the issue.[84] In response, the government attempted to resettle people from the densely populated south to the north. However, the southerners struggled to adapt to the harsh northern climate and many returned to their homes.[85] By 1416, the government had abandoned this forced resettlement policy and instead implemented a strategy of supporting local development.[86] As part of this, the government began selling salt trading licenses to merchants in exchange for rice deliveries to the north.[84][xvi] On the other hand, the influx of impoverished immigrants from other parts of north China resulted in an increase in cultivated land and the production of agricultural and textile goods. This also led to the establishment of foundries in Zunhua, located in Hebei.[85]
Finance and currency
[edit]The Yongle Emperor was unfamiliar with the Hongwu Emperor's frugal ways, as his reign saw significant spending on foreign expansion (such as wars in Jiaozhi and Mongolia, and naval voyages) and internal politics (such as the construction of a new capital and the restoration of the Grand Canal).[88][89] This resulted in a significant increase in state spending, which doubled or even tripled compared to the Hongwu era.[89] However, the exact size of this spending is difficult to determine as there was no official state budget and each source of income was allocated to cover specific expenses.[90] The government attempted to generate revenue by issuing paper money and demanding more grain from military peasants, but these measures were not enough to solve the fiscal problems. In some areas, taxes were even reduced, but the state still managed to meet its needs through requisitions and an increase in the work obligation.[89] As a result of these financial challenges, the state's reserves, which were typically equivalent to one year's income during the Ming period, reached a record low under the Yongle Emperor's rule.[91]
The economic growth was supported by the government's expansion of precious metal mining, particularly copper and silver, in southern China and Jiaozhi.[92] The government also increased the emission of paper money (banknotes, baochao). Revenues from silver mining, which previously accounted for only 30% of output, rose significantly from 1.1 tons in 1390 to over 10 tons in 1409, and remained at this level for the rest of the Yongle Emperor's reign.[93] The government also produced coins from the mined copper, which were stored in state treasuries and given as gifts to foreign embassies. However, these coins continued to circulate on the domestic market alongside the baochao, in contrast to the Xuande and Zhengtong eras (1425-1447) when they were removed from circulation under government pressure.[94]
The Yongle Emperor, like his father, believed that banknotes were the foundation of currency. In order to cover the deficit caused by expensive foreign policies and the relocation of the capital, he printed large volumes of these banknotes.[94] However, this excessive printing led to inflation, the most severe in the Ming period.[95] By 1425, paper money was only worth 2% of its nominal value, causing the population to reject it. In an attempt to encourage its circulation, the government required fees to be paid with these banknotes, but this had little impact.[94] Additionally, the repeated bans on the use of silver in commercial transactions (in 1403, 1404, 1419, and 1425) were also unsuccessful.[95]
Officials and title holders were no longer solely compensated with grain, as the Hongwu Emperor rules had originally intended. Instead, senior officials received only 60% of their salary in grain, while lower officials received a mere 20%. The remaining portion was paid in bills and coins. However, this method of payment using devalued banknotes resulted in a significant decrease in the already low salaries of these officials. As a result, many officials and officers resorted to seeking illegal sources of income.[84]
The Yongle Empror, in particular, sought to increase income from military farms (juntun; 軍屯).[84] However, the northern borderland, where most of the military units were located, was largely barren. In order to make up for the lack of resources, officers resorted to becoming landowners and using the labor of their soldiers, leading to desertion among the ranks.[88] Despite the government's efforts to control and increase production, the military peasants consistently delivered less each year. For example, their production dropped from 23 million shi of grain in 1403 to 14 million in 1407 and eventually to 5 million in 1423.[96]
Taxation and levies
[edit]Under the Yongle Emperor's reign, the amount of land tax collected was significantly higher than in previous decades, with a yield of 31–34 million shi of grain. In comparison, the land tax in 1393 was only 29.4 million shi.[97] However, the actual burden of the tax was also influenced by transportation costs and additional fees that were collected to cover them. In some cases, the tax was not collected in grain, but rather in silk and other commodities, based on calculations determined by the state. These calculations often did not reflect the current market prices, resulting in the tax being increased multiple times.[97]
The taxation in Jiangnan remained exceptionally high, with Suzhou and Songjiang prefectures supplying 14% of the empire's land taxes.[97] Unfortunately, the residents of Jiangnan were not able to pay these high taxes, leading to a significant amount of arrears in the early 1430s. For example, Suzhou Prefecture alone had 8 million shi of grain in arrears. In response to this issue, the Xuande Emperor eventually reduced their taxes.[98]
Part of the materials and labor required for government construction projects were purchased using surpluses collected in state granaries. However, these purchases were made at prices set by the state, which were lower than market prices.[99] As a result, the increased demands of the state had a significant impact on the population, primarily through the implementation of more and more extraordinary levies and the growth of compulsory work for the state. For example, the work duty of artisans, which was typically 30 days a year, was often extended for periods longer than a year.[89] Additionally, the cost of importing rice to Beijing fell on the peasants of the Yangtze River Delta. These taxpayers were responsible for supplying rice to southern port cities, from where it was then transported north by the army.[100] To cover these costs, a tax surcharge was imposed,[89][100] which had to be paid in money.[100] However, both the sea route to the north and the inland route were expensive and inefficient. Fortunately, the opening of the Grand Canal in 1415 greatly improved transportation conditions.[87] By 1418, taxpayers themselves were responsible for transporting rice all the way to Beijing. However, in 1431, the government relieved them of this duty and soldiers once again began to transport grain along the Grand Canal.[97]
In an effort to reduce the government's demands on its subjects and limit government spending, the Yongle Emperor's successors implemented reforms.[99] Despite these efforts, maintaining a large army and supplying Beijing continued to be a difficult task.[91]
Construction
[edit]New capital city
[edit]
The Yongle Emperor's most significant accomplishment was the relocation of the capital to Beijing. The idea of moving the capital from Nanjing (then known as Yingtian)[xvii] to the north was first considered by the Hongwu Emperor in the early 1390s. Despite Nanjing's proximity to the empire's economic center in the Yangtze Delta, both Hongwu and Yongle emperors faced the challenge of governing from a great distance from the empire's northern and western borders, which required a significant amount of attention. Additionally, as a foreigner in Nanjng, the Yongle Emperor likely felt more at home in Beijng, which served as his political base. Beijing was also strategically located on the northern border,[102] accessible by the Grand Canal and in close proximity to the sea, making it a convenient location for supplies. Its history as the capital of the Liao, Jin, and Yuan empires also added to its significance.[103]
The relocation of the capital was a highly challenging undertaking that demanded a significant mobilization of both people and resources from all corners of the country to be transferred to the outskirts of the empire. The emperor initiated the move of the metropolis in February 1403 by elevating Beijing to a secondary capital[103] and renaming it from Beiping (Pacified North) to Shuntian (Obedient to Heaven). However, it was commonly referred to as Beijing (Northern Capital).[104] He appointed his eldest son, Zhu Gaochi, to administer the city and province, and established branches of ministries and chief military commissions in Beijing. In 1404, he relocated 10,000 families from Shanxi to the city[103] and exempted it and the surrounding area from taxes for two years. The following year, over 120,000 landless households from the Yangtze Delta were relocated to the north,[105] and construction of government buildings began.[103] The government also began felling trees in the forests of Jiangxi, Huguang, Zhejiang, Shanxi, and Sichuan to provide wood for the palaces in Beijing. Artisans and laborers were sent from all over the country, but the work was slowed by supply issues.[106]
In March 1409, the emperor arrived in the north for the first time in seven years,[48] following the end of the first Mongol campaign. However, upon his arrival in Nanjing the following year, officials protested the excessive spending on construction in Beijing. As a result, spending was reduced and the pace of construction slowed for several years.[106]
From 1414 to the end of 1416, the emperor remained in Beijing during the campaign in Mongolia. During this time, the reconstruction of the Grand Canal was completed in 1415, which greatly aided in the supply of the north. Construction then resumed at a faster pace.[106] The exact number of workers involved in building the city is unknown, but it is estimated to have been several hundred thousand.[107][xviii] The chief architect was a Viet eunuch named Ruan An. By the end of 1417, most of the palaces were completed, but construction on the walls continued. In 1420, the city was deemed ready for the relocation of the government. On 28 October 1420, Beijing was officially declared the principal capital of the empire, and by February 1421, ministries and other government agencies had relocated to Beijing.[107]
In 1421, a famine broke out in the northern provinces.[110] At the same time, three major audience halls in the newly built Forbidden City were destroyed by fire. This event shook the emperor, who saw it as a sign of displeasure from Heaven. In response, he called upon government officials to critique the mistakes of the government. One of the officials, a junior secretary named Xiao Yi, strongly criticized the decision to build the capital in the north and was subsequently executed. This effectively silenced any further discussion on the matter.[107]
The empire was administered by the Beijing authorities from 1421, although some ministries remained in Nanjing. However, their powers were limited to the southern metropolitan area and held little political significance.[107] The cost of supplying Beijing, which was located far from the economically developed regions of the country, was a constant burden on the state treasury.[72] Despite this, Beijing remained the permanent capital of the Ming dynasty.
Grand Canal
[edit]
During the centuries leading up to the Yongle Emperor's reign, the Grand Canal was neglected and partially disappeared.[xix] In the early years of the Yongle Emperor's rule, there were two routes for transporting rice to Beijing to feed the city's inhabitants and northern troops. The first route began at Liujiagang in the Yangtze Delta and went through the East China Sea to Tianjin. However, this route was risky due to weather and pirates.[22] The second route, which went through the rivers and canals of Anhui, Shandong, and Hubei, was problematic because cargo had to be transferred multiple times.[111] Every year, 480,000 to 800,000 shi of rice were transported by sea, and even more was transported by inland waterways, with a total of 2 to 2.5 million shi delivered to the north in 1410–1414.[87] This slow and difficult transportation of rice put a heavy burden on the population. Local officials in Shandong petitioned the emperor to improve transportation by restoring a continuous waterway from south to north, and the emperor approved.[111] The government then sent 165,000 workers to reconstruct the waterway, and they built a system of fifteen locks in western Shandong.[3][111] After the reconstruction was completed in 1415, transportation became faster and cheaper.[87] In 1417 and 1418, the amount of rice shipped increased to 5 and 4.7 million shi, respectively, due to the Yongle Emperor's projects, before falling again to 2–3 million per year.[112] The transportation was provided by 160,000 soldiers with 15,000 ships,[108] and maintenance was carried out by 47,000 workers.[113] The opening of the Grand Canal led to the economic growth of the regions it passed through.[xx] It also resulted in the end of sea transportation of rice to the north, which caused a decline in naval shipbuilding.[xxi]
The reopening of the Grand Canal had a positive impact on Suzhou. Its strategic location in the middle of the canal network south of the Yangtze (which was reconstructed after 1403)[114] allowed the city to regain its status as a major commercial hub and experience a return to prosperity after being deprived of it during the reign of the Hongwu Emperor. Meanwhile, Nanjing's political and economic influence declined, relegating it to a regional center, but it remained the foremost cultural center of the empire.[115]
Other construction projects
[edit]The Yongle Emperor completed the Xiao Mausoleum, where his father and founder of the dynasty, the Hongwu Emperor, was buried. A grand Sifangcheng pavilion was constructed, featuring an eight-meter stele carried by a bixi turtle. The stele bore an inscription honoring the virtues and accomplishments of the deceased emperor. Originally planned to be 73 meters tall, the stele was ultimately left unfinished at the Yangshan Quarry due to difficulties in transportation and erection.[116]
While the Hongwu Emperor had intended for the tombs of future Ming emperors to be located near his own tomb, only his eldest son Zhu Biao was buried there. When the capital was relocated to Beijing, the Yongle Emperor made the decision to also move the dynastic burial grounds. After consulting with feng shui experts, a site was chosen on the southern slopes of the Tianshou Mountains, approximately 50 km north of downtown Beijing. This became the final resting place for the Yongle Emperor and his twelve successors.
In Huguang, a large-scale construction project was undertaken by the Yongle Emperor, who employed twenty thousand workers over a period of twelve years to build a complex of Taoist temples and monasteries on the Wudang Mountains. The result was a grand structure consisting of 9 palaces, 81 temples, and 36 monasteries, all connected by over 100 bridges.[117] The main objective of this project was to gain popularity among the people and to erase any negative impressions left by the previous emperor's overthrow and harsh treatment of secret societies.
Another notable construction project during this time was the Porcelain Tower in Nanjing, which was built between 1412 and 1422 by over a hundred thousand soldiers and workers.[118] This impressive structure, made entirely of white "porcelain" bricks, stood at over 70 meters tall[xxii] and served as a prominent landmark in Nanjing until its destruction during the Taiping Rebellion.
Culture
[edit]The emperor portrayed himself as a patron of education and a model Confucian leader in order to solidify his legitimacy. He actively promoted traditional education, commissioned the compilation of Confucian classics, and declared Confucianism as the official state ideology.[122] In 1414, he tasked scholars from the Hanlin Academy with creating a comprehensive collection of commentaries on the Four Books and Five Classics by Zhu Xi and other prominent Confucian thinkers of his school. This project was completed by October 1415 and became the official guide for teaching and examinations.[123]
The Yongle Encyclopedia was the most significant and extensive collection of encyclopedias during the Yongle era. The emperor commissioned Grand Secretary Xie Jin to compile a collection that included all known books, either partially or completely. This project involved 2,169 scholars from the Hanlin Academy and the Imperial University and took four years to complete, finishing in December 1407.[124] The scope of the encyclopedia was vast, consisting of 22,277 juan, with the contents alone spanning 60 juan.[xxiii] However, it was not published and only a few manuscripts were kept in the imperial libraries. Currently, only 700 juan have survived. This encyclopedia covered a wide range of topics and included materials from all fields of Chinese literature. Its significance lies in its contribution to the preservation of Chinese literature, as it was used by compilers in the 17th century.[126]
The emperor was known for his tolerance towards Chinese philosophical and religious schools, even those that he personally disagreed with. While he did support Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, he showed a preference for Confucianism. However, he also considered strict Confucians to be hypocritical. In addition to his respect for Chinese culture, he actively rejected Mongolian customs, language, clothing, and names. He also displayed benevolence towards Muslims, providing financial support for the repair of mosques. As a result, mosques built during the Yongle era in Nanjing and Xi'an have been preserved.
He was impressed by the lamas invited from Tibet. In Beijing, there were several monasteries staffed by Tibetans, with a population of no less than two thousand.[127] However, his reverence for Buddhism had its boundaries. He only allowed his subjects to become monks to a limited extent, following the Hongwu Emperor's decree that only one man out of forty could do so.[128] On the other hand, he promoted the spread of Buddhism among the non-Chinese peoples of the empire, but with purely political motives—to pacify conflicts and maintain peaceful rule over them.[129]
Foreign policy
[edit]During the Yongle era, Ming China was considered the strongest, wealthiest, and most populous country in the world.[130] The Yongle Emperor, along with the Xuande Emperor to a large extent, stood out from their predecessors and successors due to their active and expensive military and diplomatic efforts.[98] Their main goal was to expand the influence of the Ming dynasty beyond the borders of China. In just over twenty years of the Yongle Emperor's reign, his envoys visited to numerous nearby and distant countries, seeking to establish at least a symbolic recognition of the Ming emperor's supremacy and sovereignty.[131] Similar to his father, the Yongle Emperor had hoped to conquer Mongolia in order to resolve security concerns in the north. To the east and south, the Ming dynasty controlled the seas from Japan to the Strait of Malacca.[130] Chinese naval forces maintained peace on trade routes in Southeast Asia and regularly visited the Indian Ocean, a region that had previously been rarely explored by the Chinese.[132] In addition to Mongolia, Ming missions also ventured into Manchuria in the north and the Timurid Empire in the west.
In an effort to incorporate countries from around the world into the tributary system of subordination to the Ming dynasty, the emperor utilized a combination of military force, diplomatic contacts, trade exchange, and the spread of Chinese culture.[133] According to Confucian political thought, China was to be seen as the center of civilization by other nations and states. These missions not only demonstrated the power of the Ming dynasty, but also enforced recognition of the Yongle Emperor's supremacy and brought valuable local products.[134] The strength of the Ming dynasty is evident in the number of rulers from Asian states who made the journey to China. It was rare for monarchs to leave their own country, highlighting the immense pressure they were under.[135]
Foreign trade
[edit].JPG)
One of the main reasons for engaging in foreign activities during the Yongle Emperor's reign was to revive China's declining foreign trade, which had suffered under the isolationist policies of the Hongwu Emperor.[136] Foreign trade was seen as a valuable source of additional income for the imperial treasury, which was necessary given the high government expenditures at the time. However, the Ming emperor maintained a monopoly on foreign trade and entrusted it to his personal servants—eunuchs. He also strictly prohibited his subjects from engaging in overseas trade and only allowed foreigners to enter China for tributary missions. Any violation of this state monopoly, known as the Haijin policy, was considered a serious offense and was punished by the government as piracy or smuggling.[137]
During the Yongle era, there was a significant increase in foreign trade. Large quantities of porcelain were exported to traditional markets in East and Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Ottoman Empire.[93] The export of silk and silk clothing was even more significant, as it had a major impact on economies throughout Asia. For example, Bengali textile mills imported Chinese silk for processing and re-export, while Egyptian textile manufacturers suffered from competition from the East.[93]
The revival of trade in East Asia was accompanied by an outflow of copper coins from China to other regions such as Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, and India.[81] This led to the growth of Malacca and ports in northern Java, which became more important than older trading centers. The influx of Chinese coins also boosted local trade. Chinese copper coins were the standard currency in Brunei, Sumbawa, and the Moluccas until the early 16th century.[138]
China's prosperity also had a positive impact on other regions such as Central and Western Asia, Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, India, the Middle East, and East Africa.[139] However, in more distant countries, where silver was the only valuable commodity for trade, its outflow to China's economy became a concern. In the first decades of the 15th century, governments from London to Cairo complained about the outflow of silver to the East.[140]
Tibet and Nepal
[edit]In Tibet, the Hongwu Emperor did not establish contacts with the kings of the Phagmodrupa dynasty, but instead with the Karmapa, who ruled southeastern Tibet (Kham), which was adjacent to China. The first envoy from the Karmapa arrived in Nanjing in late 1372. The 5th Karmapa, Deshin Shekpa, was known for his reputation as a miracle worker and had already caught the Yongle Emperor's attention while he was still a Prince of Yan.[141] After ascending the throne, he sent a mission led by the eunuch Hou Xian () and the monk Zhiguang (智光) to request a visit from Deshin Shekpa.[142] In 1407, Deshin Shekpa finally arrived in Nanjing,[141] where he was gifted and admired by the Yongle Empror. He also took the opportunity to visit Mount Wutai.[143] According to Tibetan records,[141] the Yongle Empror even offered to provide an army to help secure Deshin Shekpa's rule over Tibet, but the Karmapa graciously declined.[142][144] Missions from the Karmapas continued to come to China until the late 1540s.[143]
After the Karmapa's visit, the Yongle Empror sent several delegations to other religious leaders in Tibet.[143] These delegations were led by Yang Sanbao (楊三保), who visited multiple monasteries and convinced several princes to pledge their allegiance to the Ming dynasty. Yang even traveled as far as Nepal, where delegations from Hou Xian and Deng Cheng also visited.[145] In response to an invitation from the Ming government, representatives from the Tibetan Buddhist schools of Sakya and Gelug also journeyed to Nanjing.[143] This strategy of maintaining relationships with various religious schools while ignoring the Tibetan kings ultimately contributed to the fragmentation of Tibet, which was likely a deliberate policy.[146]
Central Asia
[edit]In the western regions, the Yongle Emperor sent embassies to various cities and states in Central Asia, ranging from the Chinese border to the Timurid Empire. His goal was to establish his superiority and receive tribute by offering Chinese titles and goods in exchange. This tactic proved successful as local rulers, such as Engke Temür of Hami, accepted the title of king (wang) in 1404. Even the three leaders of the Oirats, who were the dominant Western Mongols in Dzungaria, submitted to Ming demands in 1409. However, not all rulers were as receptive. In Samarkand, the emperor's embassies were unsuccessful and were executed by Emir Timur, who controlled Central Asia. This was similar to the fate of the Hongwu Emperor's embassies before.[147] Timur then gathered an army of 200,000 in Otrar, with the intention of conquering China. However, he died in February 1405 before he could carry out his plans.[148] His descendants were too preoccupied with internal conflicts and had no interest in waging war against China.[147]
The most significant aspect of the Ming dynasty's relations with Central Asian states was the lucrative trade that existed between them. This trade was so profitable that local states were willing to acknowledge their formal subordination to the Ming emperor.[149] Between the years 1402 and 1424, a total of 20 missions were sent from the Timurid capitals of Samarkand and Herat, 44 from Hami, 13 from Turpan, and 32 from other Central Asian states. These missions brought tribute to China in the form of precious metals, jade, horses, camels, sheep, and even lions. In return, they received silk and other luxury goods, as well as paper money which they could use to purchase goods in Chinese markets.[150]
In Central Asia, Hami maintained close relations with the government of the Yongle Emperor. He sent envoys multiple times a year. However, the Ming government attempted to control trade and discourage independent private activities.[149] Trade with Turpan and Oirats occurred with less frequency. The Ming government also opposed the ongoing conflicts between Central Asian states, although their efforts were not always successful. They were unable to influence the internal affairs of these states.[151]
Timur's successors, Khalil Sultan and from 1407, Shah Rukh, maintained positive relations with the Ming court.[75] In fact, the Yongle Emperor even sent his chief experts on foreign affairs, Chen Cheng, Li Xian (李暹), and the eunuch Li Da (李達), to Samarkand and Herat.[152] Furthermore, in his correspondence with Shah Rukh, the Yongle Emperor gradually stopped insisting on his subordination, showing a shift towards a more equal relationship. This was likely due to a shared interest in trade, which was prioritized over maintaining prestige.[148]
Mongolia
[edit]The Ming government attempted to incorporate the Mongols into the tributary trade system. In this system, the Mongols would provide horses and other domestic animals in exchange for paper money, silver, silk, cloth, and titles and ranks for their leaders. However, the Ming government placed restrictions on the amount of trade allowed. If the nomads were unable to obtain enough goods through peaceful means, they resorted to raiding.[153] As a result, many Mongols migrated to China and often served in the military instead of being conscripted into the declining Weisuo system.[133]
The Mongols were divided into two main groups: the Western (Oirats) and Eastern Mongols. In addition, the Uriankhai formed a separate group.[153] The Ming dynasty had a strong relationship with the Uriankhai, who aided the Yongle Emperor during the civil war and earned his trust. As a result, the Yongle Emperor resettled them in the territory that had been vacated by Ming troops in 1403.[133]
During the early years of the Yongle Emperor's reign, the Mongols of eastern Mongolia remained persistently hostile.[147] However, the Ming government was able to establish relations with the weaker Oirats and their envoys began to visit China regularly from 1408.[154] In 1409, the Oirats, encouraged by the Ming, launched an attack on the Eastern Mongols.[155] In response, the Ming army also attacked the Eastern Mongols, but suffered a defeat in September of that year, resulting in the death of their commander Qiu Fu.[156] This prompted the emperor to personally take action against the Mongols. In March 1410, he led an army of hundreds of thousands from Beijing[xxiv] and after a three-month campaign, he was able to defeat Öljei Temür Khan Bunyashiri and the Mongol chingsang Arughtai.[155] Following this victory, the emperor returned to China. As a result, the Ming dynasty enjoyed peaceful relations with the Eastern Mongols, who were now led by Arughtai, for the next ten years.[158]
The period of peace in the north was short-lived. In April 1414, the Yongle Emperor launched a second campaign into Mongolia, this time against the formidable Oirats.[157] The Oirat cavalry suffered heavy losses in a battle along the upper Tuul River due to the superior firepower of the Ming artillery. In August, a content Yongle Emperor returned to Beijing.[159]
The period of peace in the north came to an end in 1421 when the Eastern Mongols began to launch raids across the border. Despite facing opposition from his ministers, the Yongle Emperor decided to march against them in 1422, 1423, and 1424. However, his efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. The large amount of money spent on equipping the armies proved to be a waste when the Mongols refused to engage in battle.[160] The emperor died while returning from his fifth campaign in Mongolia.[161]
Despite his best efforts, the Yongle Emperor was unable to subdue the Mongols. The campaign into Mongolia did not result in any lasting changes and proved to be extremely costly.[161] Although the Chinese had larger troops, more resources, and better weaponry, the nomads' mobility and the vastness of the battlefield negated these advantages.[162] The constant feuding among the Mongol leaders eventually led them to become hostile towards China. In the end, the Yongle Emperor's policies, particularly the decision to withdraw to the Great Wall, weakened the Ming dynasty's position in the steppe.[161]
Manchuria, Korea, and Japan
[edit]Among the Jurchens living in Manchuria, the Ming government aimed to maintain peace on the borders, counter Korean influence, acquire horses and other local products such as furs, and promote Chinese culture and values among them.[163] In 1403, the Yongle Emperor sent the first mission to Manchuria, offering Chinese goods and titles in exchange for the Jurchens' recognition of their subordination.[164] From 1411 onwards, the Yongle Emperor dispatched expeditions led by the eunuch Yishiha to the distant hunting tribes of northern Manchuria.[164] Yishiha's squadron sailed down the Amur River, reaching as far as its mouth at Tyr, and declared the local Jurchens as subjects of the Ming dynasty.[165]
By acknowledging their subordination to the Ming emperors, the Koreans were able to secure their northern border. This not only brought stability to the border, but also strengthened the legitimacy of the Korean government through official recognition from China. The ruling Joseon dynasty only came into power in 1392.[166] The exchange of envoys, which had been frequent under previous emperors, continued during the Yongle Emperor's reign. The Yongle Emperor's first ambassadors arrived in Korea in 1402 to announce the new emperor's ascension. In the years that followed, there were regular contacts between the two countries, with the Koreans sending two to three delegations per year. Some of the Ming's demands were seen as excessive and difficult by the Koreans, but they still fulfilled them. These demands included providing horses and oxen for military purposes,[xxv] bronze Buddha statues, relics, paper for printing Buddhist literature, and even sending girls to serve in the imperial harem.[166] However, the Koreans maintained their autonomy in internal affairs.
During the Hongwu era, relations with the Ashikaga government of Japan were at a standstill. Hu Weiyong, who was executed in 1380, was accused of conspiring with Japanese assistance.[167] However, in 1399, Shōgun Yoshimitsu took the initiative to restore contacts in order to make profit from trade with China.[168] This led to another mission being sent in 1403, during which the Yongle Emperor's sovereignty was recognized. In the same year, the Ming government opened maritime trade offices in Ningbo, Quanzhou, and Guangzhou, which allowed Japanese merchants with government licenses to trade. However, in 1411, new Shōgun Yoshimochi implemented an isolationist policy and interrupted official relations. He also rejected the Ming's attempt to re-establish relations in 1417.[167] Despite this, the allure of Chinese coins and goods was too strong for the Japanese to resist,[168] and illegal private trade continued from the ports of southern Japan.[167]
Đại Việt
[edit]In the late 14th century, Đại Việt (present-day northern Vietnam) was facing internal weakness. In 1400, Lê Quý Ly overthrew the Trần dynasty and changed the name of the state to Đại Ngu. Despite pleas from Viet refugees to the Ming government to restore the fallen dynasty, the Yongle Emperor recognized the new Viet government and confirmed Lê Quý Ly's son as the ruler of Đại Ngu in the winter of 1403. However, relations between the two countries were strained due to escalating border disputes. Lê Quý Ly prepared for the impending conflict and continued to engage in border skirmishes. In the spring of 1406, his soldiers even ambushed a Ming diplomatic envoys accompanying the Trần pretender.[169] In response, the Yongle Emperor ordered an invasion. By late 1406, the Ming army had attacked Đại Ngu from two directions, quelling resistance by mid-1407. In July, the country was officially annexed to the Ming dynasty as Jiaozhi Province.[170]
In 1408, a rebellion led by supporters of the Trần dynasty broke out and was eventually suppressed by the Ming army in 1409.[171] However, this was not the end of unrest as another rebellion erupted shortly after and was only fully crushed in 1414 when the Chinese captured the rebel leader, Trần Quý Khoáng. Despite this, the majority of the Ming army was unable to withdraw until 1416.[171] By the end of 1417, the Viet people rose up in rebellion once again.[172] This time, they were led by Lê Lợi, a skilled military leader who gained widespread support from the population. Despite their efforts, until the end of the Yongle Emperor's reign, the Ming generals were unable to suppress the rebellion.[xxvi]
Other Southeast Asian countries
[edit]
In Southeast Asia, the Ming dynasty had a strong presence during the Yongle era. From 1402 to 1424, the Ming government sent 62 missions to Southeast Asian countries and states (excluding Đại Việt), and received 95 in return.[175] This included important countries such as Champa, Malacca, Ayutthaya (in present-day Thailand), Majapahit (centered in Java), Samudera in Sumatra, Khmer, and Brunei, all of which paid tribute to the Yongle Emperor. These local rulers sent precious metals, spices, and rare animals to China, and in return received Chinese goods and coins.[176] The Ming government showed a strong interest in trade and left a lasting impression of their naval power in Southeast Asia, although their focus shifted to northern affairs after 1413.[177]
The ruler of Brunei was the first foreign ruler to sail to Nanjing and visit the Yongle Emperor's court. This visit resulted in more favorable terms of trade relations for Brunei compared to other countries.[177] However, tributary exchange with the Philippines was limited.[137] Champa was a significant ally against insurgents in Jiaozhi, as they were traditional enemies. However, relations cooled in 1414 when the Yongle Emperor refused to return territories previously conquered by the Viets. Despite this, official missions between the two countries continued. Ayutthaya was viewed positively by the Ming dynasty and had a peaceful relationship with them. In exchange for Ming protection of Malacca, Ayutthaya provided tribute and received profits from the trade.[176]
The rise of Malacca as a significant trading center can be attributed to the support of the Ming dynasty.[178] This support was crucial for the Chinese as it provided them with a strategic foothold in the Strait of Malacca and a reliable vassal. In fact, three successive rulers of Malacca made visits to the imperial court to pledge their loyalty to the Yongle Emperor.[176] As a result, the Ming dynasty established a fortified trading post in Malacca,[179] which served as a supply base for their missions to the Indian Ocean.[180] Additionally, during the first third of the 15th century, the sultan of Samudera, had a close association with the Ming dynasty, with the Ming fleet stationed on a nearby island to support him in times of war.[178]
The Javanese Majapahit Empire weakened in the early 15th century due to the division of Java and civil war. The presence of the Ming dynasty suppressed its influence in Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, and the southern Philippines.[181] In Java itself, the Ming fleet forcibly subdued the local rulers.[176] In 1407, the Ming expedition became involved in the local conflicts, resulting in the loss of 170 Chinese soldiers. Ming envoys then coerced the Javanese king into paying an indemnity of 60,000 liang (2,238 kg) of gold, threatening that Java would suffer the same fate as Đại Việt if they did not comply.[182]
Indian Ocean
[edit]
In 1405, the Yongle Emperor appointed his favorite commander, the eunuch Zheng He, as admiral of a fleet with the purpose of expanding China's influence and collecting tribute from various nations. A total of two thousand ships were constructed to aid Zheng He in his seven voyages, including numerous large "treasure ships".[183][184]
In the early years of the Yongle Emperor's reign, Timur's campaigns disrupted traditional trade connections with Central Asia. As a result, one of the initial goals of sending emissaries by sea to the Indian Ocean may have been to find potential allies against the Timurid Empire of Timur.[185] However, this goal became less relevant when Timur died in 1405, at the beginning of the campaign to China. The Ming dynasty then established proper relations with his successors.
From 1405 to 1421, Zheng He embarked on six voyages to the Indian Ocean. The first voyage took place from 1405 to 1407 and consisted of 250[186] or 317[187][188] ships, including 62 large "treasure ships".[186] A total of 27,800 people were on board.[189] The final voyage was made during the reign of the Xuande Emperor from 1431 to 1433. Chinese sailors followed the main trade routes of Southeast and South Asia, sailing into the Indian Ocean. During the first three expeditions, they sailed to South India, with their main destination being Calicut, the commercial center of the region. In the following four voyages, they reached Hormuz in Persia, while separate squadrons visited various ports in the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa.
In addition to foreign policy and trade goals, Zheng He's expeditions also had the task of mapping the countries visited and had an educational aspect as well.[190] The Chinese were interested in bringing back exotic animals and plants for medicinal purposes.[191]
However, after the deaths of the Xuande Emperor and Zheng He, the practice of large-scale expeditions was discontinued. The loss of key supporters of long-distance sailing was just one factor in the decision to abandon an active maritime policy. The officialdom saw the high cost of equipping the fleet as a way for the eunuchs to gain disproportionate power. As a result, reducing spending on the navy also reduced the influence of the eunuchs at court.[192]
Death and legacy
[edit]
On 1 April 1424, the emperor embarked on his final campaign into Mongolia. However, the campaign was unsuccessful and the emperor fell into a deep depression. He died on 12 August 1424 in Yumuchuan, located north of Duolun.[103] While official annals do not provide a specific cause of death, private records suggest that the emperor suffered from multiple strokes in his final years, with the last one ultimately proving to be fatal.[177] He was buried in the Chang Mausoleum (長陵), the first of the Ming tombs located north of Beijing.
He was given the posthumous name Emperor Wen (Cultured Emperor) and the temple name Taizong (Grand Ancestor), which was customary for second emperors of the dynasty. In 1538, the Jiajing Emperor changed the temple name to Chengzu (Accomplished Progenitor) in order to strengthen the legitimacy of his decision to elevate his father to imperial status after his death. However, the use of the character cheng, which means perfection, completion, or accomplishment, shows a high level of respect for the Yongle Emperor and his accomplishments.[194]
For Chinese historians in the following centuries, he represented the ideal ruler—an energetic and capable general who led China to power, while also being a Confucian and a restorer of traditional institutions. He was also credited with unifying northern and southern China. However, they also criticized his violent overthrow of his predecessor and the subsequent purges. His high spending on foreign expansion and domestic projects, particularly the relocation of the capital, was met with sharp disapproval even during his lifetime. Late Ming historians, however, justified the negative effects of his rule as necessary for building a powerful empire. They also strongly condemned the Yongle Emperror's interventions in education, as his promotion of neo-Confucian orthodoxy led to a decline in scholarship and intellectual development.[195]
Modern historians, such as Chan Hok-lam and Wang Yuan-Kang,[90][196] argue that the Yongle Emperor's desire for a unified China and domination over the world ultimately led to decisions that proved problematic in the long run.[90] They believe that abandoning the outer defense line north of the Great Wall was a strategic mistake, making the country more vulnerable to attacks. Additionally, the economic downturn at the time made it difficult to support large military operations, while the strict control over trade with the Mongols only worsened relations between the two.[196] The invasion of Đại Việt was also a mistake, as the Ming defeat weakened the empire's reputation in Southeast Asia.
Family
[edit]Consorts and issue:
- Empress Renxiaowen, of the Xu clan (1362–1407), personal name Yihua
- Princess Yong'an (1377–1417), personal name Yuying, first daughter
- Married Yuan Rong, Marquis of Guangping (廣平侯 袁容) in 1395, and had issue (one son, three daughters)
- Zhu Gaochi, the Hongxi Emperor (16 August 1378 – 29 May 1425), first son
- Princess Yongping (永平公主; 1379 – 22 April 1444), personal name Yuegui, second daughter
- Married Li Rang, Marquis of Fuyang (富陽侯 李讓) in 1395, and had issue (one son)
- Zhu Gaoxu, Prince of Han (30 December 1380 – 6 October 1426), second son
- Zhu Gaosui, Prince Jian of Zhao (19 January 1383 – 5 October 1431), third son
- Princess Ancheng (安成公主; 1384 – 16 September 1443), third daughter
- Married Song Hu, Marquis of Xining (西寧侯 宋琥) in 1402, and had issue (one son)
- Princess Xianning (咸寧公主; 1385 – 27 July 1440), fourth daughter
- Married Song Ying, Marquis of Xining (西寧侯 宋瑛; d. 1449) in 1403, and had issue (one son)
- Princess Yong'an (1377–1417), personal name Yuying, first daughter
- Noble Consort Zhaoxian, of the Wang clan (d. 1420)
- Noble Consort Zhaoyi, of the Zhang clan (昭懿貴妃 張氏)
- Consort Gongxianxian, of the Korean Andong Gwon clan (1391–1410)
- Consort Zhongjingzhaoshunxian, of the Yu clan (d. 1421)
- Consort Kangmuyigonghui, of the Wu clan (康穆懿恭惠妃 吳氏)
- Zhu Gaoxi (朱高爔; 18 January 1392 – January/February 1392), fourth son
- Consort Gongshunrongmuli, of the Chen clan (恭順榮穆麗妃 陳氏; d. 1424)
- Consort Duanjinggonghuishu, of the Yang clan (端靜恭惠淑妃 楊氏)
- Consort Gongherongshunxian, of the Wang clan (恭和榮順賢妃 王氏)
- Consort Zhaosujinghuixian, of the Wang clan (昭肅靖惠賢妃 王氏)
- Consort Zhaohuigongyishun, of the Wang clan (昭惠恭懿順妃 王氏)
- Consort Huimuzhaojingshun, of the Qian clan (惠穆昭敬順妃 錢氏)
- Consort Kanghuizhuangshuli, of the Korean Cheongju Han clan (d. 12 August 1424)
- Consort Kangjingzhuanghehui, of the Korean Choi clan (康靖莊和惠妃 崔氏; 1395–1424)
- Consort Anshunhui, of the Long clan (安順惠妃 龍氏)
- Consort Zhaoshunde, of the Liu clan (昭順德妃 劉氏)
- Consort Kangyishun, of the Li clan (康懿順妃 李氏)
- Consort Huimushun, of the Guo clan (惠穆順妃 郭氏)
- Consort Zhenjingshun, of the Zhang clan (貞靜順妃 張氏)
- Consort Shun, of the Korean Im clan (順妃 任氏 1392–1421)
- Consort Hwang, of the Korean Hwang clan (d. 1421)
- Lady of Bright Deportment, of the Korean Yi clan (1392–1421)
- Lady of Handsome Fairness, of the Korean Yeo clan (1393–1413)
- Beauty Gongrong, of the Wang clan (恭榮美人 王氏)
- Beauty Jinghui, of the Lu clan (景惠美人 盧氏)
- Beauty Zhuanghui (莊惠美人)
- Unknown
- Princess Changning (常寧公主; 1387 – 5 April 1408), fifth daughter
- Married Mu Xin, Marquis of Xiping (西平侯 沐昕; 1386–1453), the fourth son of Mu Ying, on 20 June 1403, and had issue (one son)
- Princess Changning (常寧公主; 1387 – 5 April 1408), fifth daughter
Ancestry
[edit]| Zhu Sijiu | |||||||||||||||||||
| Zhu Chuyi | |||||||||||||||||||
| Empress Heng | |||||||||||||||||||
| Zhu Shizhen (1281–1344) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Empress Yu | |||||||||||||||||||
| Hongwu Emperor (1328–1398) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Lord Chen (1235–1334) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Empress Chun (1286–1344) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Yongle Emperor (1360–1424) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Lord Ma | |||||||||||||||||||
| Empress Xiaocigao (1332–1382) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Lady Zheng | |||||||||||||||||||
See also
[edit]
Notes
[edit]- ^ a b Conferred by the Hongxi Emperor
- ^ a b Changed by the Jiajing Emperor
- ^ He held the second highest rank and served as the commissioner-in-chief of a military commission. For his participation in the campaign of 1370, he was appointed the Marquis of Huaian in June 1370. From February 1371, he governed the Beiping province; he was dismissed in 1374 and died on his way to Nanjing in the same year.[15]
- ^ Zhu Fu served under the prince from 1373 to 1388, becoming his chief tutor in 1377. He was diligent and honorable, and had a great influence on the prince, becoming his confidant. In 1416, Zhu Di posthumously awarded him the title of minister.[16]
- ^ Salt was then purchased from producers and sold to the population with a large profit.
- ^ The prince's right to visit his brothers after three or five years was lost. The government now appointed not only the highest but all officials of the princely households. The judicial authority of the princes was limited.[32] The maximum stipend for princes was reduced from 50,000 shi of grain to 10,000 in order to relieve the state treasury.[33]
- ^ They were, listed by age: Zhu Gang, Prince of Jin in Taiyuan; Zhu Di, Prince of Yan in Beiping; Zhu Gui, Prince of Dai in Datong; Zhu Zhi, Prince of Liao in Guangning; Zhu Quan, Prince of Ning in Daning; and Zhu Hui, Prince of Gu in Xuanfu.
- ^ They were Zhu Su, Zhu Gui, Zhu Bo, Zhu Fu and Zhu Bian.[38]
- ^ Li Youzhi, Beiping surveillance commissioner, and Zhang Xin (張信), Beiping regional military commissioner.[42]
- ^ For example, Zhu Hui, Prince of Gu, was relocated from Xuanfu to Changsha, while Zhu Quan, Prince of Ning, was moved from Daning to Nanchang.[55]
- ^ Huang Huai was from Zhejiang, Yang Rong from Fujian, and the remaining officials from Jiangxi. Jiangxi was known for its high level of education, with sixteen out of the top thirty students in the palace examinations of 1400 coming from this province. However, many officials from Jiangxi, particularly Huang Zicheng, were associated with the Jianwen government and responsible for the civil war. After 1402, they refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Yongle Emperor. In an attempt to appease this resistance, the emperor welcomed local elites into his court, but the young Hanlin scholars remained steadfast in their loyalty.[61]
- ^ In 1393, Beiping province had a population of 1,926,595 inhabitants.[74]
- ^ Chan Hok-lam in The Cambridge History of China Volume 7 states that the withdrawal occurred due to financial reasons,[78] while Wang Yuan-Kang in Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics writes about the "withdrawal for unclear reasons".[77]
- ^ The isolated Kaiping was difficult to defend, leading to its abandonment by the Ming army in 1430.[77]
- ^ Later, during the reign of the Xuande Emperor, these commands became more stable and evolved from a temporary structure into a regular part of the army, becoming more professional than the typical inland units.[79]
- ^ These merchants also supplied rice to armies in the southwest and Jiaozhi.[87]
- ^ During the Ming dynasty, Nanjing was known as Yingtian, while Nanjing (unofficially South Zhili) referred to the metropolitan area governed by Nanjing authorities since 1421. This area encompassed the present-day Anhui and Jiangsu provinces.
- ^ According to American historian Patricia Ebrey, hundreds of thousands of workers were involved in the construction of Beijing.[108] Historian Ray Huang estimates that there were 100,000 artisans and 1 million laborers involved in the project.[109]
- ^ During the Yuan dynasty, rice was supplied to Beijing from the south via sea routes.
- ^ Northern South Zhili, Henan and Shandong.[113]
- ^ Later, officials opposed the resumption of rice transportation by sea in order to prevent the development of the naval fleet.[80]
- ^ It was either 72 meters (236 feet)[119][120] or 79 meters (260 feet)[121] tall.
- ^ According to other sources, the Yongle Encyclopedia consisted of seven thousand volumes, 22,938 juan, and 50 million words.[125]
- ^ The Yongle Emperor's army was said to have had either 300,000[157] or 500,000[155] soldiers.
- ^ In 1403, the king of Korea sent over 1,000 horses and 10,000 oxen. In 1404, 3,000 more horses were sent, and in 1407, before the first Mongolian campaign, another large number of horses was sent.[166]
- ^ The war finally came to an end in late 1427 when the Xuande Emperor made the decision to withdraw from Jiaozhi. This withdrawal was carried out in the first few months of the following year.[173] By 1431, the newly established Viet state of the Lê dynasty was recognized as a tributary state, although it remained independent in all other aspects.[174]
References
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 64.
- ^ a b Atwell (2002), p. 84.
- ^ a b Ebrey (1999), p. 194.
- ^ Tsai (1996), p. 157.
- ^ a b Chang (2007), pp. 66–67.
- ^ Lorge (2005), p. 116.
- ^ Tsai (2002), pp. 80–81.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 20.
- ^ Chan 2007, p. 46.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 194.
- ^ Chan (1988), p. 216.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 23.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 25.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 26.
- ^ a b Tsai (2002), p. 27.
- ^ Tsai (2002), pp. 27–28.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 28.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 30.
- ^ Tsai (2002), pp. 28–29.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 29.
- ^ Chan (2005), p. 59.
- ^ a b c d e Tsai (2002), p. 33.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 32.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 46.
- ^ Langlois (1988), p. 177.
- ^ Tsai (2002), pp. 47–48.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 48.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 49.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 50.
- ^ a b Tsai (2002), p. 51.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 51–52.
- ^ a b Tsai (2002), p. 52.
- ^ Langlois (1988), p. 175.
- ^ a b Tsai (2002), p. 53.
- ^ Langlois (1988), p. 178.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 55.
- ^ Langlois (1988), pp. 178, 181.
- ^ a b Tsai (2002), p. 61.
- ^ Chan (1988), p. 192.
- ^ a b Tsai (2002), p. 62.
- ^ a b c Chan (1988), p. 195.
- ^ a b Tsai (2002), p. 63.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 196.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 198.
- ^ Chan (1988), p. 199.
- ^ Chan (1988), p. 200.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 201.
- ^ a b Chan (2007), p. 94.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 71.
- ^ Chan (1988), pp. 201–202.
- ^ Chan (1988), p. 217.
- ^ Chan (1988), pp. 211–212.
- ^ Dreyer (1982), p. 212.
- ^ a b c Dreyer (1982), pp. 213–214.
- ^ a b c Tsai (2002), p. 76.
- ^ a b c d Chan (1988), p. 245.
- ^ Chan (1988), p. 206.
- ^ Chan (1988), p. 207.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 208.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 95.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 97.
- ^ Chan (1988), p. 209.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 93.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 94.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 211.
- ^ a b c Chan (1988), p. 212.
- ^ Wang (2011), p. 103.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 213.
- ^ a b Tsai (2002), p. 98.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 99.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 100.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 244.
- ^ Chan (1988), p. 246.
- ^ a b c Chan (1988), p. 247.
- ^ a b Dreyer (1982), p. 203.
- ^ a b Wang (2011), p. 110.
- ^ a b c d Wang (2011), p. 116.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 248.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 249.
- ^ a b Dreyer (1982), p. 2002.
- ^ a b Atwell (2002), p. 86.
- ^ Tsai (2002), p. 78.
- ^ Tsai (2002), pp. 78–79.
- ^ a b c d Chan (1988), p. 250.
- ^ a b Tsai (2002), p. 112.
- ^ Brook (1998), p. 29.
- ^ a b c d Chan (1988), p. 252.
- ^ a b Wang (2011), p. 118.
- ^ a b c d e Huang (1998), p. 108.
- ^ a b c Chan (1988), p. 275.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 276.
- ^ Brook (1998), p. 68.
- ^ a b c Atwell (2002), p. 87.
- ^ a b c Von Glahn (1996), p. 74.
- ^ a b Von Glahn (1996), p. 73.
- ^ Wang (2011), p. 112.
- ^ a b c d Chan (1988), p. 254.
- ^ a b Chan (1988), p. 256.
- ^ a b Huang (1998), p. 109.
- ^ a b c Chan (1988), p. 251.
- ^ "Chinese architecture | Ming Dynasty, Pagodas, Courtyards". Encyclopædia Britannica.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ Chan (1988), p. 237.
- ^ a b c d e Chan (1988), p. 238.
- ^ Mote (2003), p. 598.
- ^ Dreyer (1982), p. 184.
- ^ a b c Chan (1988), p. 239.
- ^ a b c d Chan (1988), p. 241.
- ^ a b Ebrey (2006), p. 224.
- ^ Huang (1997), p. 175.
- ^ Brook (1998), p. 30.
- ^ a b c Brook (1998), p. 47.
- ^ Chan (1988), p. 255.
- ^ a b Brook (1998), p. 48.
- ^ Brook (1998), p. 56.
- ^ Brook (1998), p. 75.
- ^ Yang, Xinhua; Lu, Haiming (2001). Nanjing Ming Qing jianzhu 南京明清建筑 [Ming and Qing architecture of Nanjing] (in Chinese). pp. 595–599, 616–617. ISBN 7-305-03669-2.
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{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: year (link) - ^ Tsai (2002), p. 84.
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{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: year (link) - Levathes, Louise (1994). When China ruled the seas: the treasure fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405-1433 (1 ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0671701584.
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Further reading
[edit]- Rozario, Paul (2005). Zheng He and the Treasure Fleet 1405-1433 : A Modern Day Traveller's Guide from Antiquity to the Present. Singapore: SNP Editions. ISBN 9789812480903.
